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Free Will, Moral Responsibility and ADHD 
 
Gordon Tait, QUT 
 
 
Abstract 
 
One of the oldest problems in philosophy concerns the relationship between free will and moral 
responsibility.  If we adopt the position that we lack free will, in the absolute sense—as have 
most philosophers who have addressed this issue—how can we truly be held accountable for 
what we do?   This paper will contend that the most significant and interesting challenge to the 
long-standing status-quo on the matter comes not from philosophy, jurisprudence, or even 
physics, but rather from psychology.  By examining this debate through the lens of 
contemporary behaviour disorders, such as ADHD, it will be argued that notions of free will, 
along with its correlate, moral responsibility, are being eroded through the logic of psychology 
which is steadily reconfiguring large swathes of familiar human conduct as pathology.  The 
intention of the paper is not only to raise some concerns over the exponential growth of 
behaviour disorders, but also, and more significantly, to flag the ongoing relevance of 
philosophy for prying open contemporary educational problems in new and interesting ways.      
 
Introduction: schools, pathology and punishment 
 
As any number of contemporary writers on education have pointed out, one of the most 
fundamental and significant features of the modern school is its pervasive disciplinary 
apparatus (Symes and Preston, 1997).  This is generally regarded as being comprised of various 
sets of normalising practices, spatial and temporal schema, and architectural arrangements.  All 
of these elements are underpinned by the notion that through constant and relentless 
surveillance, pupils learn to regulate their own conduct and, hopefully, become responsible 
citizens.  Children learn to make appropriate, sanctioned decisions on the assumption that they 
will be held accountable for transgressions, transgressions now made visible through the 
disciplinary machinery of the mass school.  Governance is thus ultimately founded upon self-
governance; that is, the recruitment of young people into their own self-reformation.  In turn, 
self-governance itself is founded upon a number of crucial assumptions, the most significant of 
which, is the belief that we all have the capacity to make free choices, and that we can be held 
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accountable for those choices.  After all, if students cannot do otherwise, why bother trying to 
make them? And why bother with punishment?  However, the axiom of voluntary and 
accountable human action, central not only to educational practice, but also to the foundations 
of our self-understanding, is not without its exceptions.  The following two associated 
examples, dealing with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), are worth some 
scrutiny, primarily as a way of providing a pivot for some of the philosophical issues to be 
discussed later in the paper.  The examples are neither shocking nor extreme, rather they are 
significant only as a consequence of their relative predictability and mundanity. 
 
A pupil in Tennessee, who had previously been diagnosed with ADHD, kicked a water pipe in 
a school lavatory until it burst, an act for which he was suspended for three days.  At a school 
hearing into the matter, the student‟s psychologist testified that the act of vandalism “was a 
manifestation of [the] disability”.  The principal argued that while this may have been true of 
the vandalism, the incident itself occurred in an area of the school the student had been 
forbidden to enter, and therefore that this was not a matter of disability but rather of discipline.  
With the student facing categorisation as a delinquent, the matter eventually ended up in court, 
where the student won.  In a matter that the potential to go all the way to Congress, the school 
district has been forced to appeal the decision, a decision it contends “has made schools a 
„lawless zone‟ for students with disabilities” (Zirkel, 1995). 
 
A pupil in Wisconsin was one of three who vandalised two elementary schools causing $40,000 
worth of damage.  His school sought to expel him, along with the two others who caused the 
damage.  During the hearing into his actions, his mother raised the possibility that he might 
have ADHD, and soon acquired a private psychologist who concurred with this appraisal, even 
though the school district‟s psychologist disagreed.  Once again, the matter ended up in court, 
with the student winning his case and avoiding expulsion as a “disabled‟ student—unlike his 
two co-vandals who only escaped expulsion by withdrawing from the school.  As the school 
district attorney pointed out, the admission of such post-hoc diagnoses is both “disturbing and 
mysterious”, and adversely affects the school‟s ability to discipline not only students with 
disabilities, but also those who may then choose to claim them (Zirkel, 2001).     
 
There is an obvious conclusion to be drawn here: students who have been diagnosed with 
ADHD—or, for that matter, any behaviour disorder—are not to be held as responsible for their 
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actions as students who have not been so diagnosed.  Such a realisation raises a number of 
interesting questions, two of which will be addressed here: first, how might this issue impact 
upon the traditional philosophical understanding of the relationship between free will and 
responsibility?  Second, what are the implications of this for the school‟s ability to exercise 
authority over students who have been allocated such labels?  In order to answer these 
questions effectively, it will first be necessary to recap some of the dominant philosophical 
positions over the notion of free will.    
 
Do We Have Free Will? 
 
This question has been the focus of philosophical discussion for over two thousand years, 
speaking, as it does, to the very foundations of what it means to be a rational and autonomous 
living entity.  The fundamental problem hinges upon the apparent irreconcilable tension 
between the sure and certain knowledge that each of us make all manner of decisions on a daily 
basis, choices based upon nothing but our own volition, and the equally sure and certain 
knowledge that we are part of a material universe, and hence subject to the same physical laws 
as any other form of matter, laws which preclude us from magically producing causation out of 
thin air.  However, the seeming impenetrability of this conundrum, aptly referred to as a 
Gordian Knot by Gilbert Ryle (1973), appears to have neither hindered discussion on the issue, 
nor prevented all manner of philosophers, theologians, physicists and other assorted 
commentators from taking up sides in what has been a long, acrimonious, and as yet, 
unresolved debate.  The debate has primarily, but not solely, been between those who believe 
that we have free will (libertarians), and those who believe that we do not, (determinists)—a 
dichotomy represented in Figure 1. 
 
(Eg. St Thomas Aquinas, Jean-Paul Sartre)
"Libertarians"
Yes
(Eg. Spinoza, John Searle, BF Skinner)
"Determinists"
No
Do We Have Free Will?
 
(Figure 1) 
 
  
3 
Libertarianism 
The libertarian position needs little explanation, in that it confirms some fundamental 
assumptions that most of us take for granted.  That is, we assume that our decisions somehow 
have their origins within us; we assume that although we are subject to external influences, the 
final choice is ours; and we assume that if valid choices do exist, then post-facto, we could 
always have acted otherwise.  The American pragmatist William James (1996: 239-240) 
understands libertarianism (or indeterminism, as he calls it), to be a realisation that:  
 
…possibilities may be in excess of actualities, and that things not yet revealed to 
our knowledge may really in themselves be ambiguous … Indeterminism thus 
denies the world to be one unbending unit of fact.  It says there is a certain ultimate 
pluralism in it; and, so saying, it corroborates our ordinary unsophisticated view of 
things.  To that view, actualities seem to float in a wider sea of possibilities from 
out of which they are chosen.  
 
St Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), essentially a libertarian, was one of the most important early 
writers to articulate the tension between the two positions.  In Summa Theologica (cited in 
Christian, 1981: 241), he stated that man has a free choice and that virtue would be of no 
account if this were not the case.  After all, the possibility of personal redemption is the 
cornerstone of Christianity.  However, if man is free to shape his own destiny, then how can 
God possibly be said to be omnipotent?  Aquinas‟ solution was to regard free will as a gift from 
that omnipotent God, and that God may know what we are going to choose—good or bad, right 
or wrong—but the choice, and the responsibility for it, is still ours alone.     
 
Later libertarians, notably Jean-Paul Sartre, have taken a different tack.  God no longer figures 
in the equation.  In fact, for existentialists such as Sartre, it is arguably the absence of God that 
defines our freedom, since without His input into shaping our lives, we are solely and 
terrifyingly responsible for ourselves, indeed we are condemned to be free (Sartre, 1947).   
According to Sartre, life has no inherent meaning, and there are no mandates to follow.  We 
have no human nature to trammel us, and no historical baggage to blame for making us what 
we are.  We are totally and unconditionally free.  The trouble with this position, of course, is 
that at a practical level it just isn‟t true, as Sartre himself undoubtedly realised.  Grossman 
(1984) states that Sartre‟s position contradicts almost everything we know about our lives, 
about the social forces that shape us, and about how we become what we are.  In that sense, 
Sartre‟s project is quite quixotic, as he is attempting to provide a viable template for living a 
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particular kind of life, rather than attempting to conduct a rigorous philosophical analysis of the 
possibility of free will.   
 
In truth, neither St Thomas Aquinas nor Jean-Paul Sartre have succeeded in providing a 
watertight (or realistically, even a very convincing) case for libertarianism, as determinists will 
continue to ask how this position can provide a coherent and empirically plausible explanation 
for how we can be the primary origin of our own decisions (Iredale, 1999).  However, 
determinism is itself not with its flaws.  Indeed, in The Critique of Practical Reason, Kant 
himself describes it as “a wretched subterfuge … petty word juggelry” (cited in Sangroom, 
1999: 47).      
 
Determinism 
In addition to his description of libertarianism/indeterminism, William James (1996: 240) also 
had a clear characterisation of determinism: 
 
What does determinism profess? It professes that those parts of the universe already 
laid down absolutely appoint and decree what the other parts shall be.  The future 
has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb … necessity on the one hand and 
impossibility on the other are the sole categories of the real.  
 
To best explain determinism, Olen (1983) follows David Hume‟s example and utilises the 
example of the billiard table, describing the case where someone plays the white ball onto the 
nine, which hits the side cushion before rolling to a halt in the middle of the table.   He points 
out that if you knew some specific details prior to taking the shot—the angle and the force of 
the shot, the distance between the balls, their weight and dimensions, the hardness of the 
cushions, the friction coefficient of the surface, and so on—it would be possible to calculate, 
with absolute accuracy, the final resting place of the nine ball.  Under such circumstances, the 
ball is not able to choose where to roll, as its movements are simply the inevitable outcome of 
other events.  They are determined. 
 
The nineteenth century mathematician, Laplace, extends this same logic with the following 
speculation:  suppose there exists a super-intelligent being that knows the location of every 
atom in the universe, along with every force acting upon those atoms, and the laws of motion 
which governs the movement of those atoms, then that being would be able to predict each and 
every event in the universe from that moment onwards, with absolute accuracy.   These perfect 
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predictions would not just involve macro-events, like the movements of planets, but also micro 
events, such as those that occur in our heads.  That is, given that our brains are made of matter, 
just like planets, the same causative laws necessarily apply, and ultimately the atoms in our 
brains follow the same rules as balls on a billiard table, with their movements being equally 
determined.  What each person says, does and thinks could then theoretically be foretold 
millions of years in advance (Shipka and Minto, 1996).  Unless we are to believe that there is 
something about human brains that gives them an ability to make atoms swerve off their 
preordained path, there is no other logical alternative to this position.  Indeed, most 
commentators would agree that if we adopt a materialist understanding of the universe and the 
human mind, a determinist position on free will is almost impossible to rebut. 
 
Many have still tried.  One of the most recent attempts has involved enlisting some aspects of 
the uncertainty that modern science deems to exist in nature.  It has been argued that the 
Heisenberg uncertainty principle—that there is a fundamental indeterminacy at the level of sub-
atomic physics—demonstrates that not all events in the universe appear to be caused by other 
preceding events, and that provides a loophole for believing that the brain may be able to 
generate its own first causes: ie free will.  This approach has in turn been rebutted by 
philosophers such as Honderich (1999) who contend that events at the quantum level exist far 
below the threshold of significance for issues such as human choices and decisions, and also 
that such micro-events are really not events at all, but rather belong to a totally different class 
of phenomena, phenomena which are entirely irrelevant to the question of determinism.   
In addition to the uncertainty principle, opening the Pandora‟s Box of advanced theoretical 
physics has only brought more bad news for the libertarians.  For example, Einstein has 
suggested that we do not live in a three dimensional Newtonian universe, passing inexorably 
through time.  Instead, we inhabit a four dimensional universe of space-time, where time does 
not pass as such, rather the past and the future both exist with equal unswerving certitude, 
mapped out from the beginning to the end, within the same instant.  Thus, James‟ assertion that 
the future has no ambiguous possibilities hidden in its womb appears all the more valid.             
  
It is not, however, only modern thinkers who lean towards the determinist position.  The 
venerated 17
th
 century rationalist, Baruch Spinoza, was also a determinist.  While still working 
theism into his conceptual framework—hardly surprising given the era in which he was 
writing—he based his understanding of human freedom, not upon free will, which he regarded 
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as a will o‟the wisp, but rather upon an understanding of the forces which shape us.  That is, he 
compares the free with the (metaphorically) enslaved by contrasting the degree of 
understanding they possess of themselves, their situation and the world in which they act 
(Sprigge 1999).  In this manner, the logic of his argument is similar to that in the famous quote 
by Peter Berger (1963, 199), wherein we are likened to puppets, only with the possibility of 
“looking up and perceiving the machinery by which we have been moved.  In this act lies the 
first step towards freedom.”  
 
And yet, other determinists have no interest in freedom whatsoever, probably the most famous 
being B.F. Skinner, as outlined in his seminal text Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971).  
Skinner contends that freedom is a myth, and that the sum total of human experience is simply 
a set of conditioned responses to given stimuli.  Extrapolating from rats and pigeons, he argues 
that we have no grounds for believing that we are any different.  He stated that there is no 
reason why the cause/effect nexus that underpins all of the natural sciences, should not have an 
exact correlate of stimulus/response in the social sciences.  The sensation of free will, and 
hence freedom itself, is simply a conditioned response.  Vulgar though Skinner‟s position is, it 
still operates with the same domain assumptions, and therefore moves across the same 
conceptual terrain, as other determinist positions.  There is a similar, although infinitely more 
subtle, logic to be found within the final paragraph of the philosopher John Searle‟s “Freedom 
of the Will”:  
 
…for reasons I don‟t really understand, evolution has given us a form of 
experience of voluntary action where the experience of freedom, that is to say, the 
experience of the sense of alternative possibilities, is built into the very structure 
of conscious, voluntary human behaviour. (Searle, 1994: 774) 
 
In this sense, Seale is contending that the experience of freedom of the will is, in some ways, 
analogous to Kant‟s arguments about the “hard-wiring” of the perception of space and time into 
the human mind.  Voluntarism similarly becomes a primary component of consciousness, a 
component which not only determines how we perceive the world, but also how we are able to 
perceive ourselves.  In the final analysis though, whether we base our analysis on libertarian or 
determinist presuppositions, the most significant issue is not really whether we have free will at 
all—even though this is hardly trivial in the grand scheme of things—rather, the critical issue is 
what all of this has to say about the notion of personal responsibility.  After all, if we are 
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simply Skinnerian rats, responding to stimulus in the same cause/effect way that balls roll 
around a billiard table, then how can we be held responsible for anything we do? 
 
Are We Morally Responsible? 
 
When we hold someone morally responsible for an action, this is to say that their good deeds 
are deserving of praise, and their bad deeds deserving of punishment.   This process forms the 
cornerstone of our ability to form moral communities.  Without holding each other responsible 
for our conduct, the basic social framework of rights and obligations characteristic of all human 
societies would be unable to function.  However, the balls on a billiard table are not blamed if 
one of them happens to roll into a pocket at the wrong time.  The determinist nature of events 
on a billiard table render the issue of blame redundant—that is, as long as the frame of 
reference is limited solely to the balls themselves.  Furthermore, rolling into a pocket is not, 
prima facie, an act laden with moral significance.   If Skinner‟s rat stole cheese from your 
kitchen, this would not be a moral issue—undesirable though it is.  However, if the cheese were 
to be stolen by Skinner himself, a number of moral conclusions could be drawn about his 
conduct, and he would rightly be held to be morally and criminally responsible.  Is this fair? Is 
there a difference?  Figure 2 sets out some of the ways these questions have been approached: 
       
Are We Morally
Responsible
for our Actions?
Eg. Bruce Waller
No
Eg. Morris Ginsberg
Yes
"Libertarians"
Yes
Eg. John Hospers
"Incompatibilists"
General term for those
who disagree with the
"Compatibilists"
"Hard Determinists"
No
Eg. David Hume
"Compatibilists"
Yes
Can We Still Be
 Held Morally Responsible
 For Our Actions?
"Determinists"
No
Do We Have Free Will?
 
 (Figure 2) 
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The two most common positions taken on the issue of free will/determinism and moral 
responsibility are generally referred to as “Compatibilism” (the view that we can still be held 
morally responsible for our conduct, even in a determinist universe),  and “Incompatibilism”, 
(the view, for whatever the reason, that the two cannot logically coexist). 
 
Compatibilism    
If we are totally determined creatures, whether we realise it or not—as most philosophers 
would contend—then can we be held morally accountable for our actions?  The Scottish 
philosopher David Hume made what is probably the most famous attempt to answer this 
question in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748.  As a compatibilist, Hume 
sees no necessary contradiction between the notions of liberty of action and causal necessity; 
that is, we can be both determined and morally responsible.  The logic of his argument is 
centred around the belief that such long-standing philosophical problems can most often be 
explained in terms of linguistic ambiguity.  In this particular case, the focus falls upon precisely 
what is meant by “liberty”.   
 
Throughout this debate, liberty has generally been placed in binary opposition to determinism.  
If we act freely, then we cannot possibly be determined; if we are determined, we cannot 
possibly regard our actions as being free, and of course, we cannot possibly be held 
accountable for our actions.  In contrast with this position, Hume argues that liberty actually 
means the power to make choices based solely upon the determinations of our will.  After all, 
the opposite of necessity is actually chance, and this has nothing to do with being free.  Hence, 
according to Hume, liberty should be placed in opposition, not to determinism, but rather to 
constraint.  Therefore, we act freely if we are untrammelled in our choices.  As Pichin (1990: 
117) states:  
 
“Thus we are offered a compatibilist account asserting no inconsistency between 
the concepts of liberty and necessity.  A human action can be necessary in the 
sense that it is the inevitable outcome of causes.  It can also be free in the sense 
that it is not subject to constraints.” 
 
Within this paradigm, moral responsibility is no longer a problem: we are responsible for the 
choices we have freely made.  Pinchin is not entirely happy with this explanation, as it still 
does not address the matter of how we can be held responsible if we could not have acted 
otherwise.  Still, there is a broad consensus that freedom is an ambiguous concept, and that 
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Hume moved the debate forward by locating at least part of the problem within language itself.  
That said, even though compatiblism is undoubtedly the dominant position within the debate, it 
is not without its critics.  More often than not, these critics are grouped together under the 
umbrella of incompatibilism, even though often the only thing they have in common is their 
status as „other‟.    
 
Incompatibilism 
The most common and obvious incompatibilist position is generally referred to as “hard 
determinism”.  This involves the assertion that our conduct is determined, but a refusal to 
accept that this state of affairs is compatible with moral responsibility.  The implications of this 
conclusion are either that we abandon holding citizens accountable for their conduct altogether, 
or we hold them accountable, even if we know this is not really the case.  John Hospers (1994) 
adopts a psychoanalytic approach to the issue, arguing that our conscious minds—the “sanctum 
sanctorum of freedom”, and the only parts of our “selves” which can logically be held 
accountable for anything—is not the driving force behind our choices or our conduct.  Rather, 
the unconscious mind is ultimately responsible for how we act, or, as Hospers (1994: 758) puts 
it: “the unconscious is the master of every fate and the captain of every soul”.  While not 
suggesting abandoning the notion of moral responsibility entirely, he does indicate that it has 
no intellectual or ethical foundation.  Significantly for this paper, he goes on to state that 
psychiatry has begun the process of coming to terms with the implications of non-conscious 
factors of human conduct in ways that philosophy has not.  Precisely what this might mean will 
be addressed later, since presumably disorders such as ADHD would be included within this 
assertion. 
 
Other approaches in opposition to compatibilism begin their analysis, not with hard 
determinism‟s refusal to accept that causal necessity and moral responsibility can co-exist, but 
rather with the premise that because being totally determined is unthinkable to us, we must 
have free will, therefore we can also be held morally responsible for our actions. In his essay 
“The Nature of Responsibility”, Morris Ginsberg (1956: 345) makes precisely this point.  He 
asks whether anyone seriously doubts that we have the minimum level of freedom necessary to 
be held morally accountable, as we make judgements every day which involve weighing the 
consequences of given acts and the relative worth of available alternatives.  Ginsberg also 
suggests that if our judgements are completely determined, then this would make a nonsense of 
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all knowledge.  Intellectual choices would become redundant—truth and falsity, sense and 
nonsense—would all be on the same epistemological level. 
 
Bruce Waller (1996) provides an interesting spin to the debate by contending that although we 
are free to make choices as we see fit, we do not deserve praise or blame for the outcomes of 
those choices, ie. we are not morally responsible.  He reaches this conclusion by suggesting 
that the good and bad events that happen in our lives are the result of “genetic-environmental 
luck”.  The uneven starts and unequal paths that lead through life undercut all assumptions 
about just deserts and moral responsibility, and the notion of moral responsibility itself not only 
acts to stifle more fruitful inquiries into the circumstances which shape our conduct, but also 
promotes iniquitous social policies and punitive rather than positive social programs.     
 
To summarise so far: the discipline of philosophy has argued back and forth about the 
relationship between free will and moral responsibility for 2000 years.  Whether a libertarian or 
a determinist, and from there whether a compatibilist or an incompatibilist, the vast majority of 
philosophers contend that we can rightly and fairly be held accountable for our actions.  Even 
the periodic intervention of theoretical physics into the debate has not altered this fundamental 
conclusion.  However, historically there has always been one more major player in the game, 
and this body of knowledge also leans heavily towards personal accountability: jurisprudence.        
 
Responsibility, Transgression and the Law 
 
At first glance, as one might suspect, the law is pretty strict and specific on the issue of 
precisely what is required for a person to be held responsible for an action.  Criminal 
responsibility is “the concept that individuals with the capacity to make voluntary and 
intentional choices to act criminally, understanding the significance of the choices, should be 
accountable to the criminal law for those choices.” (Nygh and Butt, 1998: 107).  Whether 
directly or indirectly, the principle expressed in the maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit 
rea: the act does not constitute guilt unless the mind is guilty, still drives much of the reasoning 
behind the legal approach to responsibility.  Therefore, if we make choices, voluntarily and 
intentionally, understanding the nature of those choices, we are responsible for them.  There is 
no notion here that we could somehow claim to be like one of Skinner‟s rats, acting as a result 
of given stimuli, and hence not legally or morally accountable for what we do.  Indeed, history 
suggests the reverse is more likely to be accepted as the case, given that in 1595, the City Court 
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of Leyden sentenced a dog to hang at a public gallows for killing a man, “to the deterring of all 
other dogs” (Ginsberg, 1968: 349).         
 
The seeming overt simplicity and rigidity of the legal position of responsibility actually hides a 
significant degree of flexibility.  Just because a number of people are found guilty of a 
particular offence, does not mean that they are all, a priori, regarded as possessing the same 
degree of criminal responsibility.   There are a number of mechanisms which can attenuate, 
restrict, modify or even negate responsibility, several of which are pertinent to this paper.  For 
example: 
 
Mitigating Circumstances 
According to Olen (1983), even though a morally responsible person is a rational agent, who 
knows right from wrong, and who can be influenced by moral argument—and arguably we do 
fit these criteria (determinism or otherwise)—we sometimes let each other off the hook.  In 
essence, this is a form of very weak incompatibilism.  The logic is that there are many reasons 
why people do what they do, why they make given choices, why they break the law.  These 
reasons provide a context for interpreting a level of responsibility appropriate to the situation.  
To better exemplify this position, Olen uses the James Cagney gangster movie Angels With 
Dirty Faces.  The story begins with two boys from a tough New York neighbourhood, running 
from the police.  Pat O‟Brien gets away, and grows up to be a Catholic priest, but Cagney is 
caught and sentenced to a reform school, where he grows up to be a hardened criminal.  
Throughout the film, the two compete for control over the lives of a group of boys, and the film 
ends with Cagney‟s electrocution, and O‟Brien telling the boys to say a prayer for a boy who 
couldn‟t run as fast as him.  The film‟s message is clear: crime is not only a personal issue, but 
also a social one.  While we are responsible for our lives, they are also shaped by forces beyond 
our control, and often the only difference is a matter of luck.   
 
This is also a line of reasoning championed by the famed trial lawyer Clarence Darrow. In 
Attorney for the Damned (1957) there is a transcript of his appeal to the judge for clemency in 
the celebrated case of Leopold and Loeb, two students who, for no apparent reason, kidnapped 
and killed a 14 year old boy.  Darrow (1957: 227) concludes that, ultimately, we are not 
responsible for either our genetics or our environment, and it is these factors that should 
actually shoulder the greatest burden of blame.  When discussing Loeb, he stated: 
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If there is responsibility anywhere, it is back of him; somewhere in the infinite 
number of his ancestors, or his surroundings, or in both.  And I submit, Your 
Honor, that under every principle of natural justice, under every principle of 
conscience, or right, and of law, he should not be made responsible for the acts of 
someone else. 
 
Doli Incapax 
Article 40 of the United Nation “Convention on the Rights of the Child” specifies “a minimum 
age below which children shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law.”  
This is the presumption of “doli incapax”: the inability of children to be held responsible for 
criminal conduct.  Although the specific age boundaries of this presumption vary between 
countries, the logic is still the same.  That is, children below a certain age are not capable of the 
reasoning processes necessary to be held accountable for their actions.  In Australia, the 
minimum age for criminal responsibility is ten years old.   Therefore, if a criminal act is 
committed by a person younger than ten, that person cannot be held in any way responsible, 
whatever the nature of the offence.  For children older than this, there is a transitional period up 
to the age of fourteen where they are still not responsible, unless it can actually be proven that 
the person had the capacity to know the act in question was wrong.      
 
Tyszkiewicz (2001) has a number of interesting points to make on the subject of “doli 
incapax”.  Citing writers such as Aries (1962) and Petersen (1989), he discusses the historically 
contingent boundaries of the category of childhood, noting that in medieval Europe it could be 
said not to have existed at all.  Those who would now be categorised as children participated in 
almost all “adult” activities.  The notion of childhood was only to evolve over the next three or 
four hundred years, primarily within the boundaries of the bourgeoise family.  Significantly, 
there was no notion that these embryonic children needed special protection, or that they were 
not equally capable as adults of making informed decisions, and being held responsible for 
those decisions.  Certainly, they faced identical punishment to adults—children faced execution 
for murder in England right up until 1906 (Millet, 1995).  For the purposes of this paper, one of 
the most interesting observations regarding the status of doli incapax concerns the assertion that 
the age of criminal responsibility is set “not at the age at which the child can tell right from 
wrong—most five year olds can do that—but the point at which society feels it can 
unashamedly punish” (Morris; cited in Tyszkiewicz, 2001: 17).  The implications of this claim 
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are obviously far-reaching, not only for the validity of a crucial component of our system of 
jurisprudence, but also for the logic underpinning the treatment of children in schools.    
 
Insanity 
In most common law countries, the understanding of the relationship between insanity and 
criminal responsibility was originally laid down in the case of M‟Naghten (1843), where a man 
was aquitted by a jury on the charge of murder due to his madness, causing a popular outcry at 
the time.  This case subsequently formed the basis for the “M‟Naghten Rules”, which were 
outlined by Lord Chief Justice Tindall (1843: 208) as follows: 
 
…every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of 
reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to their 
satisfaction; and to establish a defence on the grounds of insanity, it must be 
clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was 
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know 
the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not 
know he was doing what was wrong. 
 
As a consequence of these rules, the majority of debate over responsibility has tended to focus 
on the dichotomous positions of full responsibility and non-responsibility.  However, it has 
been argued that the steadily increasing focus on the criminal conduct of young people has 
played a significant role in reconfiguring the debate around varying degrees of responsibility, 
particularly in children, rather than the previous position of simple mutual exclusion.  The key 
to this process, apparently, is a greater understanding not only of types of crime as they relate 
to particular mental conditions, but also a greater understanding of the mental conditions 
themselves (Ginsberg, 1968).   
 
In a sense, Ginsberg is prefiguring a new major player in the “Do we have responsibility?” 
game—and not only in criminal responsibility, but as it turns out, responsibility in absolutely 
every avenue of life.  The psy-disciplines—primarily psychology, but also psychiatry, 
psychoanalysis, and so on—are now in the process of cutting an explanatory swathe through all 
aspects of human conduct. In doing so, they are introducing a hard determinist understanding 
of moral responsibility.  As behaviour disorders multiply exponentially, so too is human 
conduct, and in particular children‟s conduct, now explained away as pathology.  That is, more 
and more human behaviour is now regarded as a direct function of greater and greater numbers 
of disease entities.  
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Behaviour Disorders, Moral Responsibility and the School 
 
In spite of three decades of post-modern thought, scientific knowledge, and psychological 
knowledge in particular, is still most frequently presented as objective, benevolent and 
teleological, slowly uncovering the facts of the natural world, with the individual researchers 
merely perceptive but neutral observers to whom these truths are passed.  History is thus 
presented in triumphalist terms: the heroic unmasking of the hidden realities of nature, the 
shedding of light into the mysteries of the human body and mind, and the identification and 
control of independent disease entities. Superseded ways of understanding and healing are 
presented as superstitious, ignorant and/or barbaric.  However, as Wright and Treacher note 
(1982: 3-4), the categories produced by such forms of knowledge: 
 
…are social through and through; they are the outcome of a web of social 
practices and bear their imprint.  When we speak of tuberculosis we are not 
reading the label on a discrete portion of nature, „out there‟; we are instead ... 
employing a social meaning that has been generated by the activities of many 
different social groups, with diverse interests, working through many different 
forms of practice. 
 
 
There has long been dissatisfaction with elements of the labelling processes associated with 
„mental illness‟.  Seminal work by Hollingshead and Redlich (1958) noted that an individual‟s 
chance of being committed to a mental institution varied in relation to their social class—a 
variable surely irrelevant to an „objective‟ illness.  Likewise Szasz (1961, 1973) proposes a 
radical shift in the understanding of „insanity‟ due, in part, to his refusal to accept the objective 
validity of the category.   More convincingly, in Madness and Civilisation, Foucault (1965) 
details some of the social contingencies which were necessary precursors to the emergence of 
psychiatry as a discipline—all of which go some way towards attenuating the „objective truth‟ 
of insanity.  Following on from this, a number of specific mental illnesses, claiming the status 
of „objective facts‟, have had this status challenged, such as split personality (Hacking, 1986), 
and anorexia nervosa (Tait, 1993). The question which arises now is how then does a disease 
entity such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder fare under this kind of scrutiny?   
 
A Closer Look at ADHD 
The following quote is typical of the way in which ADD and ADHD are presented within the 
literature, and by those with an interest in its acceptance as a valid and objective category.  
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ADD is an inherited neurobiological disorder which becomes evident in early 
childhood and usually continues throughout a person‟s life …There is no doubt in 
the scientific community that ADD is real … ADD is not a new phenomenon, it 
has always been with us but has not always been recognised. (D. and M. Sosin, 
1996: 6-7) 
  
It is evident here that disorders such as ADD and ADHD are understood as objective 
conditions, indisputable facts of nature.  In addition, they are deemed to have existed long 
before their identification by the clear-eyed and perceptive scientists who brought them to our 
attention, thereby dispelling the former—erroneous—explanations for the same conduct.  
ADHD is diagnosed with symptoms of fidgeting, excitability, impulsivity, immaturity, and lack 
of self-control.  Estimates of the school population vary widely, from three percent to ten 
percent, although classes with much greater percentages off ADHD have been reported (Reif, 
1993).   
 
There exist numerous strategies for dealing with this new affliction (such as behaviour 
modification, counselling, cognitive therapy, social skills training), but pharmacological 
intervention through the use of the stimulant Ritalin is widely regarded as being the most 
significant.  As with other pathologised differences, schools have been charged with the 
primary responsibility of managing ADHD (almost all identification protocols, treatments and  
research literature are school-based).  Furthermore, the implications and effects of such 
(formerly) hyperactive conduct are no longer deemed to be confined either to the classroom, or 
to the schooling years.  There is now a significant literature which serves the dual purpose of 
laying the blame for a number of broader social problems at the door of ADHD (such as 
various forms of criminal conduct, delinquency, social maladjustment, emotional problems, 
professional failure, and so on) while at the same time reinforcing the need for identifying and 
tackling the problem in its embryonic stages at school (Forehand et al., 1991; Dunning, 1998).  
 
Teachers are also now expected to be able to deal with a much wider range of educational 
differences than just ADD and ADHD.  Such differences are no longer regarded as being below 
the threshold of intervention, or simply part of the human condition, but are now objective 
pathologies to be identified, categorised and normalised.  As Tomlinson pointed out as early as 
1982, this appears to be part of an ongoing and exponentially-increasing process.  After all, 
within the realm of educational difference/handicap, there were only two classifications prior to 
1890 (idiot and imbecile). This had swelled to eight by 1913 (including divisions such as moral 
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imbecile, and mental defective) and on to twelve in 1945 (with severely subnormal, 
maladjusted, and delicate). Currently, the list of such differences is enormous—in excess of 
three hundred (Whitefield, 1999)—each with its own treatment, prognosis and educational 
implications.  It is not enough for teachers to know that certain forms of shyness have now been 
pathologised as Generalised Social Phobia (Turner et al, 1992), it also helps to be aware of 
some of its nosological subdivisions—such as Selective Mutism (Black and Uhde, 1996), or 
Avoidant Personality Disorder (Holt et al., 1992)—as well as how to recognise them, what to 
do with them, and how to organise your classroom practices accordingly.  These developments 
and discoveries are normally manifest in terms of a burgeoning array of student differences, 
differences that have the potential to significantly recalibrate, or in the long term, even totally 
undermine, the moral machinery of the school.  
 
So What Does All This Mean? 
There are a number of issues here: first, until fairly recently the issue of free will and moral 
responsibility had generally involved debates between philosophers, physicists and jurists.   If 
the solution to the “Gordian Knot” were to be found anywhere, history suggested it would 
come from one of these disciplines.  However, psychology appears to be in the process of 
outflanking them all, providing increasing numbers of hard determinist explanations for what 
was once regarded as voluntary conduct.  Hard determinism, a previously unthinkable option, is 
slowly becoming mainstream. 
 
Second, disorders such as ADHD are premised upon explanations of human action, founded 
not in the reasoned conduct of responsible agents, but rather in terms of causal necessity.  
Children diagnosed with ADHD are more than likely to have any action that fits into the 
lexicon of symptoms associated with the disorder, explained as being a function of that 
disorder.  So, children diagnosed with ADHD who fidget, fidget because of that disorder.  
Children without ADHD who fidget, presumably make the free and voluntary decisions to do 
so, and hence become liable to punishment.    
 
Third, greater and greater numbers of school children are being diagnosed as suffering from 
particular forms of behaviour disorder.  Special needs children, once rare in classrooms, are 
now commonplace.  That schools should be equipped to deal with difference is not in question.  
Of course they should.  Rather, the point is that the discipline of psychology appears to be 
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engaged in the ongoing and accelerating process of creating difference.  And in the case of 
behaviour disorders, as more categories are “discovered”, more and more students will no 
longer be held fully accountable for their actions.  Whether this also turns out to be the case for 
the courts has yet to be determined.  Interestingly, the Wisconsin student who vandalised a 
school but escaped expulsion after retrospectively being diagnosed with ADHD, was held to be 
responsible for his actions under criminal law, and suitably punished. 
 
Finally, the question raised at the beginning of this paper—what are the implications of all this 
for the school‟s ability to exercise authority over students?—has two separate answers.  At one 
level, it has the potential to make the situation very difficult.  As the number of students 
claiming the status of disability continues to increase (via behaviour disorders such as ADHD), 
and as each disorder has different levels of associated accountability, schools may not only find 
themselves in the situation of being unable to hold an increasing sections of the school 
population liable for their conduct, as the two initial American examples demonstrate, but also 
of requiring some method by which they can determine levels of relative responsibility.  At a 
second level, it has the potential to make the situation much easier—at least for the highly-
stressed teacher—but only if we are prepared to leave our ethics at the school gate.  Almost all 
the disorders mentioned or alluded to in this paper are treated pharmacologically: ADHD, 
Oppositional Defiance Disorder, Generalised Social Phobia, Selective Mutism, Avoidant 
Personality Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder, to name but a very few.  To put it 
another way, teaching life will be easier because disruptive students, quiet students, or 
generally different students, will be drugged into normalcy and passivity.            
 
Conclusion 
 
The rise of the inclusive school, institutions where special needs students are to be given full 
access to, and involvement in, the daily life of the classroom, has not only placed the teacher on 
the front-line of conduct disorder management, but also at the centre of millennia-old debate 
about just who can be held responsible for what.  This process has significant implications, for 
the teaching profession, for how difference is to be conceptualised, and most importantly, for 
how the population as a whole is to be governed.  If a philosophical analysis of this issue can 
accomplish anything, it is to point to a necessity for a more rigorous conceptualisation of what 
a hard determinist society would look like.  Rather than simply taking each new disorder as a 
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separate issue, to be dealt with on its own terms, a broader understanding of the relationship 
between free will and moral responsibility leads to a clearer vision both of what behaviour 
disorders prefigure, and ultimately, what it means to be human.  After all, the truth is that 
philosophers have always known that the determinist position is far more convincing than the 
libertarian alternative.  Even Spinoza in the 17
th
 century knew we all act through causal 
necessity.  This is nothing new.  The only difference to the contemporary psychological stance 
is that he still held us accountable.  Certainly, we need to think through—very thoroughly—the 
consequences of freeing a steadily increasing percentage of the population from some or all of 
their moral responsibilities.  Of course, this is not to say that the social contexts in which 
specific forms of conduct take place should not be taken into account.  The film Angels With 
Dirty Faces illustrates how complex the notion of responsibility can be.  However, there is a 
world of difference between context and causality.    
 
Earlier in the paper, Morris Ginsberg (1968) called for a greater understanding of the mental 
conditions that increasingly shape our understanding of moral responsibility.  The implication 
here is that the psychological sciences are in the process of uncovering the essential truths of 
the human mind.  This is, however, only one interpretation of psychology‟s history and 
function.  Nikolas Rose (1985) has described an entirely different function, that of a crucial cog 
in the machinery of governmental intervention and regulation.  The rise of the psy-disciplines 
denote the emergence of a new rationale of government targeting human individuality, with the 
conduct of citizens now to be directed by investigating, interpreting and modifying their mental 
capacities and predispositions.   
 
One fruitful way of thinking about the mode of functioning of the psychological 
sciences ... might therefore be to understand them as techniques for the 
disciplining of human difference: individualising humans through classifying 
them, calibrating their capacities and conducts, inscribing and recording their 
attributes and deficiencies, managing and utilising their individuality and 
variability. (Rose, 1988: 187) 
 
Fundamental to this process is the need to categorise, to break the population down into smaller 
and smaller manageable units, because with each new category, each new behaviour disorder, 
each new pathology, comes new possibilities of governance.  Contemporary pupils are no 
longer simply too lively, they are now as suffering from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder or Oppositional Defiance Disorder, or Conduct Disorder.  Pupils are no longer simply 
quiet or shy, they are reclassified as suffering from Generalised Social Phobia, or Selective 
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Mutism, or Avoidant Personality Disorder.  Pupils are no longer simply unpopular or 
obnoxious, they are reclassified as Borderline Personality Disorder, or Antisocial Personality 
Disorder.  However, in each instance, the new possibility of governance comes at a specific 
cost: the further erosion of individual responsibility.  
 
Finally, given such pressures to pathologise those many students now produced as different, the 
question must eventually be asked about the veracity of the burgeoning array of medical and 
psychological categories such children are being placed into.  Of course, this is not to say that 
these categories are false, but what it does mean is that the next paper to be written on the 
subject of philosophy and education should really take a hard took at precisely what we mean 
when we talk about “truth”.    
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